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Abstract 
 
‘Corruption’ may be the dark side of the relationship between personal relationships and the work 
of organisations. The paper considers how studies of Public Administration, and related ideas such 
as bureaucracy, management and governance, have viewed personal relationships. It then links 
these views to corresponding approaches to preventing corruption. The third part of the paper 
looks at anti corruption activity in PNG in light of the relationship between personal relationships, 
the work of organisations and broader ideas of the public interest.   
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Influential definitions of corruption suggest that personal aims may sometimes 
undermine the work of organisations. Transparency International, the anti corruption 
NGO, originally defined corruption as ‘the use of public office for private gain’. Hong 
Kong’s anti bribery law criminalises ‘unauthorised receipts of benefits’. 
 
Maintaining ‘collaborative relations’- the first term in the title - may cause trouble 
too. In Hong Kong in the 1970s new recruits to the police were told they could ‘get on 
the bus’ of corruption, or step aside, but they shouldn’t try to stop it. To stand in front 
of the bus would disrupt working relationships, or worse. So corruption looks like the 
dark side of the relationship between personal aims, collaborative relations, and the 
work of organizations.  Or perhaps it describes situations when these are at cross-
purposes. 
 
Corruption is notoriously difficult to conceptualise and define. In an influential article, 
Mark Philp points out that most definitions imply a conception of the ‘naturally sound 
condition’ from which corruption is seen as a deviation, or falling away (2002:51). 
Thus anti corruption is paired with good governance on the World Bank’s website. 
But there is little agreement on what that ‘naturally sound condition’ is or should be. 
In PNG, for example, there are likely to be several competing visions of ‘good’ 
governance: traditional (different in different parts of the country), late colonial (when 
services were delivered), national (dating back to the 1970s) and the new liberal 
version promoted by the World Bank.  There are well-known difficulties applying 
current standards to other historical periods and other societies (ibid: 46-49).  It is also 
practically difficult to do research on. It is hard know how much bribery or nepotism 
is going on, if much takes place in secret. Opinion and rumour may overestimate or 
underestimate the amount.  
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Given these difficulties I want to focus instead on anti corruption as a practical, 
administrative activity. It has a life of its own, not simply as reflection of the amount 
of corruption, however defined, that might be going on.  There has been a sharp 
increase in international interest in anti corruption since the mid 1990s. Anti 
corruption has been a concern of the PNG government since independence, when the 
constitution provided for a leadership code, which is administered by the Ombudsman 
Commission. The PNG police have had a long-standing interest in criminalised forms 
of corruption (and the potential for corruption among their own members). Recently 
there have been proposals for an ICAC, modelled on similar commissions in NSW 
and Hong Kong and for legislation to protect whistleblowers. 
 
I want to approach the relationship between collaborative relations, personal aims and 
the work of organisations (the title of the workshop) in several steps. First I want to 
look at how the study of public administration has dealt with the relationship between 
individual aims, interpersonal relations and the work of organizations. Shifts in the 
theory and practice of public administration, as it affects universities have been one of 
the drivers of the sponsors’ interest in audit cultures (Strathern  2000). Then I want to 
ask how each approach addresses problems of corruption (see Table 1).  
  
In the second half of the paper I want to see how these arguments help understand 
PNG’s anti corruption institutions: bureaucracy itself, and the leadership code. The 
last part of the paper looks at the proposed ICAC model (and the figure of the 
whistleblower) in terms of the relationship between collaborative relations, personal 
aims and the work of organizations.  
Administration 
 
Administration is an old word that has accumulated a number of meanings (23 
according to Andrew Dunsire, 1970). One theme that runs through them is the 
carrying out of the purposes of others. X administers something for Y. The 
administration implements laws passed by parliament. The trustees are not 
administering the estate according to the terms of the will. And so on.  
 
In the terms of the workshop, the task of administration is to bring personal aims into 
alignment with the work (or aims?) of organizations. Hong Kong’s anti bribery act, 
mentioned above, and Samoa’s secret commissions act, are in this spirit of ‘good 
administration’. In Hong Kong the receipt of benefits is fine but the problem arises if 
it is unauthorised, and in Samoa the problem is that it is ‘secret’ and therefore 
unaccountable. 
 
The concept of ‘public’ administration adds a tricky fourth term to the three in the title 
of our workshop: some idea of a general, public or national interest, towards which 
the work of some organisations (and perhaps some professions) is meant to be 
oriented. 
 
Bureaucracy  
 
The standard pathology of administration is ‘bureaucracy’, a word that emerged in the 
late eighteenth century reflecting the suspicion that officials serving the king had 
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developed interests, and a power of their own (Albrow 1970). The high point of 
suspicion of bureaucratic power in the UK might be the 1970s, captured in the Yes 
Minister TV series – though the minister tends to triumph at the end of each episode.  
This series resonated with students at the University of PNG in the 1980s, when I 
used it in teaching public administration there. Since then the autonomy of public 
officials in countries like the UK and Australia has tended to be reduced, as politicians 
have asserted control in one direction, and the market from others.  
 
Public choice theory – later subsumed within a package of reforms called the New 
Public Management – provided the rationale for this counterattack against 
bureaucratic power. It claimed to unmask the self-interest of officials at the same time 
as it celebrated the efficiency of market alternatives. For example, Dunleavy (1991) 
used public choice theory to explain privatisation: his theory of ‘bureau shaping’ 
explained how it was in the self interest of senior officials to devolve the boring and 
difficult jobs of service delivery to the private sector, while they retained the cushy 
and interesting jobs making policy in the capital city. 
 
Professionalism  
 
Apart from bureaucracy, a second persistent source of disruption to simple top down 
models of administration has been professional expertise – experts like doctors, 
teachers or engineers have often found accountability to senior administrators 
onerous. Professionals typically complain about red tape, petty regulations and so on 
that prevent them getting on with their (self defined) jobs. Some of these professions 
trade on the personal character and reputation of their members, and on the personal 
relationships with clients to perform successfully (think of psychiatrists, teachers or 
masseurs). Their work is co-produced with clients. Now professions such as auditors 
play an increasing role in anti corruption activity, typically (as Power 1997 points out) 
in ensuring compliance with processes. 
 
The attractive political image of the profession is one of self-management. 
Professionals are distinctively vulnerable to particular forms of corruption, but are 
supposed to resist temptation through force of their own character, or their middle 
class status, or from fear of being embarrassed in front of respected colleagues. Their 
characteristic technique of corruption prevention is the code of conduct (perhaps 
backstopped by the law). PNG has a code of conduct that is supposed to govern the 
personal and official behaviour of leaders, in some ways as if leadership was a 
profession. 
Management 
 
Management studies differ from early theories of administration and bureaucracy by 
explicitly adopting the point of view of the people at the top of the organization. They 
emerged with the growth of large corporations and big government. Human Resource 
Management addresses interpersonal relations as an important link between individual 
aims and organisational purposes. These interpersonal links are as seen to be as 
amenable to management as other factors of production  
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Governance Networks 
 
More recently theorists of networks have noticed how government activity does not 
only involve the vertical activity of administration, the inner workings of 
bureaucracies, or the tasks of managers. Instead they are interested in the horizontal 
relationships of interaction between government officials, and various private and non 
government actors who together amount to ‘policy communities’ or ‘advocacy 
coalitions’, oriented towards particular issues (Rhodes 1990, Sabatier and Weible 
2007). These networks are bound together by similar beliefs and personal or 
professional ties.  
 
Governments in capitalist economies have always relied on and deferred to the private 
sector as the engine of growth and jobs, and networks like those the Institute of 
National Affairs have been promoting in PNG are meant to establish and maintain 
close interpersonal relations between officials and businessmen.  
 
Some theory of governance networks draws on anthropology, including Melanesian 
anthropology. Michael Taylor (1982) identified the conditions under which 
community (or network) forms of governance might persist: face-to-face interactions, 
reciprocity, the right to violent retaliation, gossip and shaming, and supernatural 
sanctions. Similarly Elinor Ostrom (1990) investigated the conditions under which 
people might be able to self manage common pool resources.  
 
Corruption involves its own ‘dark networks’ (Raab and Milward 2003). Warburton 
(2001) argues that the establishment of face to face contact plays a key role in 
developing networks of corrupt officials. Interpersonal relationships established over 
lunch, or on the golf course, become conduits for flows of illicit information, tip-offs 
and cash.  
 
The role of interpersonal relations 
 
To summarise the argument so far, the study of administration has had little to say 
about the role of interpersonal relations in aligning personal aims with the work of 
organizations (while the study of public administration has introduced a tricky fourth 
term into the argument, the public interest) 
 
However each of the other approaches we have looked has something to say about the 
role of collaborative relations in making (and by implication) breaking the links 
between personal aims and the work of organizations. 
 
Weber was concerned about the production and maintenance of a professional ethos 
within the bureaucracy, whose members must deal impersonally with clients outside. 
Bureaucracy suppresses interpersonal relations between officials and clients, but 
intensifies them among officials bound together in a spiral of lifelong careers. Heclo 
and Wildavsky (1974) looked at how the intertwined careers of civil servants in 
Whitehall created opportunities for generalised reciprocity. Any official knew that his 
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counterpart in another department might be a colleague in future, and this expectation 
muted conflict and built trust in what they characterised as a ‘village’. 
 
The combination of outward looking impersonality and inward looking personalism  
may be unstable, like priestly celibacy, or comradeship of a platoon in battle. And it 
fades towards the periphery: Michael Lipsky (1976) wrote about the work of what he 
called ‘street level’ bureaucrats, fronting up welfare offices or crisis centres. The work 
of their organizations was shaped by the pressure of their caseloads, and their 
relationships with their clients and each other. They interpreted and reinterpreted rules 
to solve practical problems. Administering ‘policy’ came a distant second to other 
front-line pressures on them. Similar day to day pressures from clients confront 
fieldworkers in more rural countries like PNG. 
 
Management treats interpersonal relations as a resource for managers, to be shaped 
and manipulated by specialists.  
 
Collaborative relations are much more fundamental - even constitutive - of network 
forms of governance. 
Corruption and Anti Corruption 
 
Each concept or theoretical approach tells a different story about corruption. In the 
case of administration, corruption is just another form of disobedience – unauthorised 
or secret. In Hong Kong the anti bribery ordinance prohibits ‘unauthorised receipt of 
benefits’ while Samoa’s legislation prohibits secret commissions. Each applies to both 
the public and private sectors. Administration’s remedies are authorisation and 
reporting.  
 
Bureaucracy is more paradoxical. In some ways it is a machine against corruption. Its 
impersonal and rule bound treatment of clients prevents favouritism. Its merit-based 
promotion prevents nepotism. The prospect of a career reduces opportunities for 
conflicts of interest. Its decent salaries reduce the need for the petty corruption of fees 
for service. Yet from the point of view of the minister or senior managers, 
bureaucracy can look a machine for preserving official privileges and resisting outside 
direction. Bureaucracy can have a corruptive effect on administration, including 
democratic administration.  
 
Management brings an array of interpersonal techniques to keep personal aims 
subordinate to organisational goals (tenure is not usually one) 
 
Professionalism relies on intensely interpersonal respectability and embarrassment, 
and sometimes (usually after a crisis) turns to formal codes of practice, with sanctions 
such as disaccreditation or ostracism. Again, as with bureaucracy, professions can 
look from the outside as corrupt associations for preserving unwarranted privileges, 
and resisting democratic scrutiny. 
 
In theories of network governance, corruption is hardly an issue, though some writers 
have recognised the presence of dark networks. Here ‘corruption’ seems a steady risk, 
rather than an isolated event, as interested stakeholders shape policy that affects them, 
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and as governments rely on private or non-government actors to advise on policy or 
deliver on services.  
 
These different approaches are set out in Table 1 
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Table 1 
 
Interpersonal Relations and Anti Corruption Practices 
 
Concept View of Interpersonal 
Relations 
Typical Anti Corruption 
practice 
Administration none Reporting, authorisation, 
accountability 
Bureaucracy Impersonal to outsiders 
Loyalty and trust among 
insiders 
Career 
Salaries 
Merit based appointments 
- street level bureaucracy Overwhelms directives 
from HQ 
Attenuated by distance 
from HQ 
Professionalism Inseparable from 
professional practice 
Respectability, 
embarrassment, codes of 
practice 
Management A resource to be used by 
managers 
Selection, training, team 
building, participation, 
counselling, warnings, 
dismissal 
Network Governance Constitutive element None so far 
 
Applications to Anti Corruption Activity in PNG 
 
There are several aspects of anti corruption activity that seem to illuminate the 
relationship between interpersonal relations and anti corruption practices, and may 
point to special circumstances in PNG. 
 
Administration versus Bureaucracy 
 
Distinctions between administration and bureaucracy help explain some aspects of 
PNG’s colonial government. The administrative character of Australian rule is often 
commented on, compared to more indirect models of rule through locally powerful 
chiefs. However professionals such as doctors, or agriculture officers often proved 
resistant to administration. Government became more bureaucratic in the 1950s and 
1960s, as specialist departments based in Canberra moved in to the territory, and the 
size, scope and capacity of government increased substantially.  
 
The key institution that has preserved the bureaucratic style (and pathologies) of 
government in PNG was the Public Service Commission, an instrument of control 
over appointments, promotions, and promoter of a common ethos 
 
Bureaucratic rule was undermined after independence from two directions. From one 
direction, elected politicians asserted control over appointments (at least at senior 
levels) and chunks of the budget (in the famous slush funds). From the other, officials 
from donor countries and the World Bank became more involved in policymaking and 
delivery. Yet recent international concern with good governance has reinforced the 
idea of an impartial civil service. 
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Many of the defining features of bureaucracy, as we have seen, have an anti 
corruption purposes. PNG also has a leadership code, and there have been proposals 
for an ICAC and whistleblower protection. Each of these has implications for the 
relationship between collaborative work, personal aims and the work of organisations, 
particularly in PNG.  
 
Leadership Code  
 
PNG’s leadership code dates back to the 1970s, and concerns then about conflicts of 
interest that might faced by a rising class of politician businessmen, personified by Sir 
Julius Chan (an opponent of strong code). An organic law sets out ‘responsibilities of 
office’ as they apply to about 600 senior officials an – through them – their families. 
These responsibilities – to avoid conflicts of interest, to refuse gifts, and to regularly 
disclose their income and assets – are more onerous than those applying to junior 
officials, and ordinary members of the public. They are additional to prohibitions 
against, for example, bribery in the penal code that apply to everyone, including 
leaders. The tribunal that investigates breaches of the code has loose rules of evidence 
than a court, but also a somewhat narrower range of penalties, ranging from fines 
through dismissal to imprisonment. 
 
The language of codes, tribunals, and misconduct (rather than laws, courts and 
crimes) points its disciplinary character. The code deals with the personal as well as 
official life of a leader. In this ways it is like a professional code of conduct, though 
one imposed from outside the profession rather than engendered from within (The 
NSW ICAC had great difficulty in persuading the NSW Parliament to adopt a much 
milder code). 
 
Leadership Codes offer a particular take on the relationship between personal aims, 
collaborative relations and the work of organizations. As with professionals, they 
break down the barriers between personal matters and work matters. A leaders family 
may be involved. And as with professionalism they trade on respectability: leader 
must not ‘demean the office’ they are occupying, or allow their integrity to be called 
into question. What counts as ‘family’ and what kinds of behaviour are appropriate or 
demeaning for ‘leaders’ are likely to be contentious questions in PNG, and differ 
across the country.  
 
The ICAC model 
 
The limited scope of the leadership code has led to proposals for a more wide ranging 
ICAC, modelled on NSW and Hong Kong. ICACs are institutional hybrids. The 
model was Hong Kong’s, and its defining characteristic has been the three-pronged 
model of: 
 
Investigation and reporting; 
Prevention; and 
Education. 
 
The ‘Independence’ was originally independence from the police, who were deemed 
to be incapable of rooting out corruption in their own ranks, but now it often refers to 
independence from the executive government, and ICACs have wider responsibilities 
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towards the public sector as a whole (indeed now another independent commission 
deals with the police in NSW). 
 
NSW’s ICAC is often compared to a standing royal commission,  that can choose 
what it investigates (rather than waiting for the government to refer things to it and 
circumscribe its terms of reference). Its special powers to investigate, and ability to 
compel officials to attend public hearings gives it the power of exposure (though they 
are not compelled to speak they may be prosecuted for lying). Heads of agencies are 
compelled to report suspicions they might have of corruption in their own agencies. 
However prosecution or disciplining of officials remain the responsibility of other 
agencies than the ICAC. 
 
In administrative terms this independence is a strength and a weakness. It puts the 
ICAC outside a top down chain of command, and the authority it might have had as 
(for example) a unit in the Premier’s office. Hong Kong’s ICAC began with strong 
support from the Governor in a colonial administrative system. It is also outside the 
powerful well-established bureaucracies it must somehow supervise (though the NSW 
ICAC has used these powers to summon agency heads to hearings). So in spite of its 
strong formal powers, it is compelled to act in collaborative, horizontal ways, building 
trust, negotiating with competitors.  
 
The prevention branch of the ICAC have developed concepts of organizational culture 
and organizational integrity that seek to harness interpersonal relations not simply to 
the work of the organization, but higher order values of public service. The NSW 
ICAC was created at a time of concern with police corruption. As in Hong Kong, 
young police officers were inducted into corruption through the examples set by their 
more established colleagues in what the ICAC called a ‘culture of corruption’. 
 
The ICAC act defines corruption in terms of the absence of ‘honesty and impartiality’ 
in the performance of the duties of a public officer. It has recently turned its attention 
to NSW universities, which come under its responsibilities for the public sector 
(though not ones organised in a bureaucratic way, or wholly funded from the NSW 
government budget)).  In a recent case it criticised officials at Newcastle University 
for covering up evidence of plagiarism at an offshore branch of the university (ICAC 
2005) It found university officials had been concerned that a reputation for severity 
against students would make the university less attractive in the competitive market 
for offshore fee paying students. 
 
University deans and other officials were not accused of corruption in the personal 
sense of taking bribes, or other personal benefits. Rather their sidestepping of the 
university’s own policies, and pursuit of the organisational goal of profitability 
amounted to a dishonest and partial exercise of their responsibilities. 
 
In this subtly argued case the personal aims of the university’s leaders were not 
opposed to those of the university. Rather they were too narrowly and zealously 
focussed of the sub-goal of profitability, and market share. 
 
So the ICAC – at least in its NSW form – forces attention beyond the ‘work of 
organisations’ to the (public) goals these organisations are meant to serve. That is 
controversial territory. 
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Whistleblower Protection 
 
There have also been calls for legislation to support ‘whistleblower’s in the fight 
against corruption. Whistleblowers are those within an organization who provide 
evidence about internal wrongdoing to outside agencies, including the media. Without 
protection they may be subject to sanctions from corrupt senior officials, or ostracism 
from colleagues. 
 
The figure of the whistleblower reverses the earlier relationship between collaborative 
relationships, personal aims and the work of organizations. Whistleblowers see 
themselves as the guardians of true values of the organization, which are being 
perverted by those in power. And they must suffer ostracism, and the disruption of 
collaborative relations, if this truth is to get out. They are also often vilified by 
superiors and colleagues as acting from ‘personal’ motivations.  By legislating to 
protect whistleblowers government are asserting a wider ‘public’ interest in the 
organisationally disruptive activities of individual members. 
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